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Executive Summary
Mexico and the European Union will soon begin the “modernisation” of their 15 year old Free Trade 
Agreement (MXEU FTA). Although MXEU FTA was the first comprehensive trade deal with a Latin American 
country, the level of trade liberalization and investment protection in subsequent EU deals has been far 
higher. The ‘renewed’ FTA with Mexico stands to go much further than its predecessor.
Independent reports have established that the current MXEU FTA has had negative consequences in terms 
of diversification of foreign trade, greater investments in development and job creation, and human rights 
protection. Far from addressing these failures, “modernising” this agreement is just a euphemism for the 
extension and deepening of investors’ protection rights. A key feature of the “modernisation” process is the 
inclusion of an investment protection chapter and a mechanism for settlement of investor-state disputes. 
If pushed through, the “modern” FTA with a full-fledged investment protection chapter will:
1. Allow foreign investors to challenge public interest legislation in Mexico and in Europe  
The current EU investment protection proposal -already included in the EU-Vietnam and the EU-Canada 
deals and being negotiated with the United States- will be rolled into all new EU trade agreements, includ-
ing the one with Mexico. 
Under this proposal companies will maintain the rights to launch multimillion-dollar arbitration lawsuits 
against the Mexican government over measures designed to protect the people and the environment. 
Contrary to what the EU claims, the Investment Court System proposed by the European Commission 
fails to protect the right to regulate. There is nothing in the text of the EU investment model that prevents 
companies from challenging public interest decisions and arbitrators from deciding in favour of inves-
tors, ordering states to pay billions in taxpayer compensation for legitimate public policy measures. The 
Commission has included ill-defined rights for investors, such as fair and equitable treatment and indirect 
expropriation. In fact, governments will have to defend public interest measures as “necessary” and in line 
with “legitimate” objectives in the face of investors’ attacks. The cases will be decided by highly paid lawyers 
–re-labelled as judges by the EC- who maintain a strong financial incentive to interpret the law in favour of 
the investor. The salaries are paid by the parties in the dispute at a rate of USD 3000 per day.
2. Locked in privatisation and pro-corporate reforms in the oil and gas sector in Mexico 
In December 2013, the Mexican government opened up, after decades, the exploitation of the oil and 
gas industry to foreign companies. EU energy companies like Shell, BP and Total have a key interest in the 
Mexican oil market. The strengthening of investment protections under the new EU MX FTA will lock in 
these reforms. Future Mexican governments will find it hard to reverse these policies without the risk of 
being sued at international investment tribunals. 
The risk of lawsuits by oil companies is real since a significant proportion of the international investment 
arbitration cases stems from the energy sector, and many involve countries that have undergone energy 
reforms. Oil and gas companies have initiated 57 known investment disputes, 80% of which were launched 
in the last 10 years. Countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region are the biggest target.
3. Make it much harder for Mexico and individual European countries to pull out of this agreement
Mexico has bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 16 out of 28 EU Member States. The majority of these 
can be terminated at any time or by 2019, giving the Mexican government great discretion to assess 
whether or not to maintain these agreements. However, if Mexico replaces the current BITs with an 
investment protection chapter in the EU FTA it would be virtually impossible to withdraw the new rights 
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granted to foreign investors. The only way would be to put an end to the whole agreement. Furthermore, 
if an individual member State wanted to consider a revision of the rights granted to Mexican investors, it 
would have to leave the European Union to roll back commitments. 
4. Put Mexico at risk of being the target of a new wave of investment lawsuits by European investors
Mexico, having already faced 23 investment treaty arbitration cases, is the seventh most sued country in 
the world. As a result of these lawsuits, it has already paid $246 million USD plus interest in “damages” to 
nine different companies. US investors have initiated most investment arbitration claims so far, but in recent 
years, several Spanish companies have also led claims against the Mexican government. Telefónica for 
example is demanding the staggering amount of over USD 1 billion in compensation for Mexico’s regulation 
of the telecommunications sector, a measure that was recommended by the Organisation for Economic  
Co-operation and Development (OECD) itself. 
By signing an investment protection agreement with the European Union, the Mexican government 
will expose itself to new investment lawsuits by European investors, potentially costing millions from 
the public budget. Investors from EU member states are the most avid users of the Investment 
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system, having initiated 53% of all known ISDS disputes worldwide. 
Investors from the Netherlands, the UK and Germany are the most active. Coincidentally, investors 
from these countries are also the ones that currently invest the most in Mexico. The higher risk of 
further lawsuits is also enhanced by the fact that, since 2000, flows of EU Foreign direct investment to 
Mexico have tripled. European investments have been mainly channeled to financial services, tourism 
and telecommunications. Investments in these sectors are particularly at risk of leading to investment 
disputes. More than half of lawsuits brought by European companies worldwide have related to 
services industries, including financial services and telecommunications. 
5. Increase the chances that EU governments become the target of lawsuits by Mexican multinationals
Mexican transnational companies are increasingly investing in Europe and in Spain in particular. 2014 
marked a record high of Mexican investment in Spain. All of these investments and takeovers would make 
European countries susceptible to investment arbitration lawsuits by Mexican companies under a new 
investment protection chapter. While for a long time, Western EU member states had been immune to 
arbitration lawsuits, in recent years the wealthier EU member states have faced 43 investment treaty cases, 
29 of which were against Spain. 
6.  Allow European companies to continue human rights violations in Mexico with impunity
European companies have a track record of human rights and environmental violations in Mexico with 
virtually total impunity. The proposed investment chapter developed by the European Union does 
nothing to address this situation. On the contrary, it will deepen the imbalance between binding rights 
for corporations and voluntary guidelines when it comes to respect of human right. The EU proposal 
does not include any obligations for investors, only rights. 
This is no surprise. The current Mexico EU FTA includes a Human Rights and Democratic Clause which 
could have triggered suspensions of the agreement in light of human rights violations. Yet, in the 15 years 
since this treaty entered into force, the European Union has ignored those violations rendering the clause 
a merely decorative element.
If Mexico and the EU move to modernise their relationship, it should be with the aim to redress the 
imbalance in favour of transnational corporations observed during 15 years of this free trade agreement 
instead of expanding investment protection by granting sweeping corporate rights to foreign investors.
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Introduction
In 2009, Spanish energy multinational Abengoa sued the Mexican government at a World Bank arbitration 
tribunal. The reason? Mexican local authorities blocked the operation of a toxic waste disposal in the 
municipality of Zimapán. This facility would have been installed only 2 kilometres away from a Natural 
Reserve and less than 500 meters from the hñañu indigenous community, putting at risk their fragile 
ecosystem, including spilling arsenic into the watersheds. The local mayor decided not to grant the license 
of operation in response to the local opposition united under the movement “Todos somos Zimapán” (We 
are all Zimapán)1. Not only was the company able to challenge a government measure intended to protect 
the environment and local communities, the arbitrators in the case ordered the Mexican government to 
pay the company 45 million US dollars in compensation for lost profits and 1.7 million US dollars in legal 
expenses and arbitration tribunal costs2. 
This is not an isolated case. Mexico alone has been the target of at least 23 investment treaty arbitration 
cases. There are almost 700 investment arbitration lawsuits worldwide which include endless examples 
of regulatory measures taken by governments in the public interest that have led to investment arbitra-
tion lawsuits and millions spent from public coffers3.
Mexico and the European Union are about to embark on the 
so-called “modernisation” of their Free Trade Agreement4 
(from now on the MXEU FTA) which entered into force in 
2000. At the time, Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner for the 
European Union, proudly called the agreement “the first, the 
fastest and best”5. This treaty was the first comprehensive 
trade deal that the EU would sign with Latin American coun-
tries. However, today, the level of trade liberalization and 
investment protection of the MXEU FTA has been surpassed 
by many other treaties. 
This “upgrading” is a part of the new strategy recently pre-
sented by the European Commission (EC), named “Trade 
for All”7. The idea to launch fresh negotiations was announced with great fanfare8 before even carrying out 
an assessment of the impacts of the current MXEU FTA. Numerous independent reports have established 
that the agreement has had negative consequences in terms of diversification of foreign trade, greater 
investments in development and job creation, and human rights protection, among others9. 
An important consideration is who is behind the push for this fresh deal. It has been noted that “the 
main drivers of the modernisation process, at least presently, are not specific problems or interests, 
but very broad considerations of geopolitics and geo-economics”10. A study developed at the request 
of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade concludes that it is the EU who has 
taken the initiative to launch new negotiations11. The same study also noted that the business sectors 
in Mexico, as well as in the EU, do not have a strong interest in the modernization efforts12. However, 
the Mexican government has expressed interest in a trade deal with the European Union that locks in 
“recent Mexican reforms in telecommunications, finance and energy” sectors13 and that resembles the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently under negotiation by the European 
Union and the United States.14
“The kinds of trade deals that 
the European Union and Mexico 
are negotiating today are very 
different to what we agreed on 
all those years ago. They remove 
many more types of barriers, 
making them much more 
effective at opening markets”
EC Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström6
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A key feature in the “modernisation” process is the inclusion 
of an investment protection chapter as well as a mechanism 
for settlement of investor-state disputes, which the EC has 
re branded as Investment Court System (ICS) in all new trade 
agreements negotiated by the EU.16  
The EC touts it as a step “towards a more responsible 
trade and investment policy”17. However, “modernising” this 
free trade agreement is just a euphemism to describe the 
intention to extend and deepen investors’ protection rights 
and other corporate friendly rules18. The new template that 
the Commission intends to roll out is the one included in the recently signed agreement with Canada 
- Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)19 and the EU-Vietnam FTA20. It is also the same 
proposal under negotiation for the TTIP21.  
If pushed through, the “modern” FTA with a full-fledged 
investment protection chapter will deepen the imbalance 
between binding rights for corporations and voluntary 
guidelines when it comes to respect of human rights. It will 
also enhance the possibility that companies like Abengoa 
keep on launching multimillion dollar arbitration lawsuits 
against the Mexican government (and potentially Mexican 
companies – ever more present in Europe - suing some 
European member states) over measures designed to 
protect the people and the environment.   
This briefing presents six key reasons why the inclusion of an investment protection chapter 
is worrisome and should be resisted.
“The need for and the 
process of updating the 
EU-Mexico arrangements 
are largely unknown to 
the Mexican business 
community”
European Parliament study15
The coming upgrade should 
end up with deals that are 
“comparable to CETA with 
Canada and TTIP with  
United States”
Federica Mogherini, EU’s foreign  
policy chief and Vice President of  
the EU Commission22
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1. Foreign Investors will be able to challenge  
public interest legislation in Mexico and in Europe  
After intense public pressure23, in November 2015, the European Commission unveiled a so-called  
new approach to investment protection – the Investment Court System – to be applied to all future EU 
agreements in replacement of the controversial Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement mechanism (ISDS). It was promoted as a 
solution to the egregious attacks made by investors under the 
ISDS system24. The European Commission claimed that govern-
ments’ ability to regulate in the public interest is protected25. 
They also claim that the EU investment proposal sets up an 
independent public court that is substantially different from pri-
vate arbitration and secures the impartiality of arbitrators, now 
called judges26. The main elements of this ICS proposal have 
already been included in the EU-Vietnam27 and the EU-Canada28 
deals and are currently being negotiated with the United States 
in the context of the TTIP 29.
However, a close review of the EU investment proposal gives a very different picture. In fact, far from 
addressing the fundamental flaws of the arbitration system, the Investment Court System is a rebranded 
version of ISDS. A thinly guised attempt to “put lipstick on a pig” as some have described it31.
On the one hand, the Commission has failed to protect the right to regulate. There is nothing in the 
text of the EU investment model that prevents companies from challenging public interest decisions – 
e.g. for health or environment protection. The Commission has included ill-defined rights for investors, 
such as fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation. Simply stating that governments have 
the right to regulate in the public interest will not prevent investors from launching lawsuits when they 
feel their (expected) profits are in danger. In fact, governments will have to defend whether public 
interest measures are “necessary” and meet “legitimate” objectives in the face of investors’ attacks. 
Moreover, nothing would prevent arbitrators from deciding in favour of investors, ordering states to 
pay billions in taxpayer compensation for legitimate public policy measures. This creates the risk of 
regulatory chill — the mere threat of a multi-million dollar international arbitration lawsuit can lead gov-
ernments to step back from implementing social and environmental protection measures that could 
affect the interests of foreign investors. 
A key way to test the claim on the right to regulate made by the EC, is by analysing whether some of 
the most controversial arbitration cases in recent years could still be launched under the ICS proposal. 
A legal study of the cases Philip Morris vs Uruguay; TransCanada vs the US; Lone Pine vs Canada; 
Vattenfall vs Germany; and Bilcon vs Canada shows they would all have a strong chance of success 
under ICS, because the new system still grants investors ample and ill-defined rights32. Table 1 lists the 
rights granted to investors under the proposed TTIP agreement, in which the EU has incorporated its 
proposals for an Investor Court System. This will almost certainly form the basis for the MXEU FTA.  
Furthermore, the EU investment proposal includes other dangerous substantive rights for investors 
such as National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation Treatment, the Umbrella Clause and a provision 
ensuring the free flow of capital (a de facto ban on capital controls) 33.
“When people say that ISDS 
is dead, it makes me think 
of a zombie movie because 
I can see ISDS walking 
around in these new 
proposals all over the place”
Professor Gus Van Harten,  
Osgoode Hall Law School30
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Investors’ right 
granted under ICS What the EC claims How can investors (ab)use these rights?
34
“Fair and Equitable 
Treatment” standard
The text in the TTIP proposal 
which is likely to form the 
basis for the MXEU FTA:
“A Party breaches the obli-
gation of fair and equitable 
treatment where a measure 
or a series of measures 
constitutes: “denial of jus-
tice”, “fundamental breach 
of due process”, “manifest 
arbitrariness”, “targeted 
discrimination” and “harass-
ment, coercion, abuse of 
power or similar bad faith 
conduct”35 
“The standards of protec-
tion have been narrowly 
and clearly defined to 
prevent abuse.”36 The FET 
clause, the EC asserts, “is 
defined through a clear, 
closed text which defines 
precisely the content of 
the standard without 
leaving unwelcome dis-
cretion to arbitrators”37
It is problematic that the EC chose to include the most widely used 
and expansively interpreted investment protection standard38. 
At first sight, one might think that indeed the list developed by the 
European Commission narrows the scope of this dangerous clause. But, 
the inclusion of “manifest arbitrariness” as one of the criteria that inves-
tors can invoke as a breach of this clause leaves the door wide open for 
investors to sue and for arbitrators to interpret it to their discretion. 
When studying what investors have argued in emblematic public 
interest cases, we found that it is not uncommon for companies to 
argue that the measures sanctioned by the State were “arbitrary”. For 
example, in the Transcanada’s arbitration claim over the US decision 
to reject the contested Keystone XL oil pipeline, the company claimed 
the decision was based on “politically-driven” and “arbitrary criteria”39. 
Tobacco giant Philip Morris called, in the course of the arbitration 
dispute, Uruguay’s anti-smoking measures “excessive”, “unreasonable” 
and “arbitrary” and denied they are related to public health policy40. 
Investors presented similar argumentation in the cases of Lone Pine 
vs Canada41 and Vattenfall vs Germany42. Arbitration Tribunals have, 
in some cases, also considered arbitrary the measures taken in the 
interest of the environment. This was the case of the tribunal’s ruling 
in the Bilcon case vs Canada43.
So, what constitutes manifest arbitrariness is clearly not well defined 
and there is plenty of “unwelcome discretion” that arbitrators can 
exercise.
Investors’ “legitimate” 
expectations
The text in the TTIP proposal 
which is likely to form the 
basis for the MXEU FTA:
“When applying the above 
fair and equitable treat-
ment obligation, a tribunal 
may take into account 
whether a Party made a 
specific representation 
to an investor to induce 
a covered investment, 
that created a legitimate 
expectation, and upon 
which  the  investor  relied 
in deciding  to  make  or  
maintain  the  covered  
investment,  but  that  
the  Party  subsequently 
frustrated”44.
“The ‘legitimate expecta-
tions’ of the investor may 
be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the 
standard. However, this is 
possible only where clear, 
specific representations 
have been made by a 
Party to the agreement 
in order to convince the 
investor to make or main-
tain the investment and 
upon which the investor 
relied, and that were sub-
sequently not respected 
by that Party. The inten-
tion is to make it clear 
that an investor cannot 
legitimately expect that 
the general regulatory 
and legal regime will not 
change”45.
The European Commission has widened the fair and equitable treat-
ment concept by explicitly allowing tribunals to take into account 
the notion of investors’ “legitimate expectations”. The only restriction 
included by the Commission is that investors’ legitimate expectation 
be preceded by “a specific representation” of the state. But this is so 
vaguely worded that it could mean any measure, action or even verbal 
indication by a government official that, according to the investor, 
have induced it to make or maintain the investment.
It is very common for investors to claim a breach of their legitimate 
expectations. And most put forward claims that could be interpreted 
as “specific representation” from the relevant government authori-
ties to induce the investment. For example, TransCanada in its case 
against the US, argues that its “reasonable expectation” that the US 
would process its application “fairly and consistently with past actions” 
was “not met” and that the government had led it to believe that 
the pipeline would be approved46. Philip Morris, in its case against 
Uruguay, claimed “the measures [taken by Uruguay] frustrate one of the 
most fundamental expectations that any investor may have, which is that 
a host State will comply with its own law and respect private property ” 47. 
The company argued that the government “encouraged” the company 
“to expand its operations…”48. Finally, an arbitration tribunal ruled that 
Canada frustrated Bilcon’s “legitimate expectations” as the company 
had been encouraged by provincial government officials to pursue 
the quarry project49.
TABLE 1  
Under ICS, investors maintain ample rights to sue
TABLE 1  
Under ICS, investors maintain ample rights to sue
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Indirect expropriation
The text in the TTIP proposal which is likely  
to form the basis for the MXEU FTA:
“Neither Party shall nationalize or 
expropriate a covered investment either 
directly, or indirectly through measures 
having an effect equivalent to nationalisa-
tion or expropriation..., except: a) for a  
public purpose; b) under due process of 
law; c) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
and d) against payment of prompt, ad-
equate and effective compensation.”50
This article has to be interpreted together  
with Annex 1, point 3: 
“For greater certainty, except in the rare 
circumstance when the impact of a mea-
sure or series of measures is so severe 
in light of its purpose that it appears 
manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory 
measures of a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate policy 
objectives, such as the protection of pub-
lic health, safety, environment or public 
morals, social or consumer protection 
and promotion and protection of  
cultural diversity do not constitute  
indirect expropriation.”51
“Detailed language has 
been agreed upon to clarify 
what constitutes indirect 
expropriation, particularly 
excluding claims against 
legitimate public policy 
measures”52
The EU proposal contains significant loopholes for 
investors to continue arguing that measures taken to 
protect public health, safety or the environment have 
an effect equivalent to expropriation. 
The key ambiguities are found in the annex that is 
meant to clarify further the article on indirect expro-
priation. Only “legitimate” public policy measures that 
are not “manifestly excessive” would be out of reach 
from indirect expropriation demands. But, what is 
the criterion to determine whether the government 
measure is legitimate and when it is excessive? 
Even in cases where the government’s measure that 
led to dispute was undeniably for a public purpose, 
investors have claimed the policies were illegitimate 
and excessive. For example, TransCanada argued 
that the US administration’s decision on the pipeline 
was not for a legitimate public policy objective53. 
Philip Morris International argued that the restric-
tions imposed did “not bear any rational relationship to 
a legitimate governmental policy” 54. Lone Pine accused 
Canada of “arbitrary” and “capricious” behaviour, 
questioning the authority’s motivation because it had 
not proved that fracking was harmful55. Vattenfall 
similarly contested the public interest dimension of 
the regulatory changes on the water permit56. 
Article on the “right to regulate”
The text in the TTIP proposal which is likely  
to form the basis for the MXEU FTA:
“1. The provisions of this section shall 
not affect the right of the Parties to 
regulate within their territories through 
measures necessary to achieve 
legitimate policy objectives, such as 
the protection of public health, safety, 
environment or public morals, social or 
consumer protection or promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity.
2. For greater certainty, the provisions 
of this section shall not be interpreted 
as a commitment from a Party that it 
will not change the legal and regulatory 
framework, including in a manner that 
may negatively affect the operation of 
covered investments or the investor’s 
expectations of profits”.57
It clearly states that the 
right to regulate for public 
policies is fully preserved.  
The inclusion of an article on the right to regulate 
is misleading and gives a false sense of security 
because:
1- The investors might not be able to demand that 
the government roll back legislation, but nothing in 
the article prevents them from claiming compensa-
tion from the governments. This difference becomes 
especially evident when comparing it with the second 
part of the article where the Commission explicitly 
prohibits investors from demanding compensation 
when governments reduce or withdraw an EU “sub-
sidy” including “state aid” as defined in the EU law58.
2- governments will have to prove that any regulations 
introduced were “necessary” and sought to achieve 
“legitimate” objectives. The definitions of “necessary” 
and “legitimate” are open for interpretation59. 
3- The proposal only states that investment protection 
“shall not affect” the right to regulate. This is a much 
less precise formulation and therefore does not con-
stitute an effective safeguard for regulatory flexibility. 
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The other key claim made by the European Commission (EC) about their current model is that they are set-
ting up an independent public court and securing the impartiality of arbitrators. “The elements proposed 
for the operation of the Investment Tribunal, are an effective way to insulate judges from any real or 
perceived risk of bias,” the EC claims60. However, ICS is not a court since it is based on an arbitration model. 
Fundamental safeguards to ensure an independent legal system are still missing61. Despite re-labelling arbi-
trators as judges, they will still be highly paid lawyers with an interest in more and longer cases. The parties 
in the dispute will pay them per case. Therefore, they maintain a strong financial incentive to interpret the 
law in favour of the investor. The European Association of Judges (EAJ), representing 44 judges associations 
in Europe, also doubts the Commission’s designation of arbitrators as judges: the ‘provisions for the elec-
tion, time of office and remuneration for the judges of the ICS do not meet the minimum standards for ju-
dicial office as laid down in the European Magna Carta of Judges or other relevant international texts on the 
independence of judges.’62 There are also flaws in the proposed ethics requirements, with no cooling-off 
period either before or after serving on the roster of arbitrators, no clear definition of conflict of interests, 
and no explicit ban on being paid for related work while sitting as an arbitrator.
Finally, the ICS proposal retains special treatment for foreign investors. They are the only ones who can 
initiate lawsuits, and the proposal does not impose any obligations on them, such as compliance with en-
vironmental, social, health and safety, or other regulatory standards. In other words, it’s a one-way system, 
like playing football in half of the pitch. One team attacks and the other can only defend itself63. Foreign 
investors would still be allowed to circumvent domestic courts.  
2. Privatisation and pro-corporate reforms in the oil 
and gas sector in Mexico will be locked in
A main concern that arises from including an investment pro-
tection chapter in the Mexico-EU Free Trade treaty is that the 
economic policies of the current Mexican government, that have 
disproportionately benefited a small number of corporations, will 
be locked in, and future Mexican governments will find it hard to 
revert these policies without the risk of being sued at international 
investment tribunals. 
In December 2013, the Mexican government opened up, after 
decades, the exploitation of the oil and gas industry to foreign 
companies64. 
In a speech about the modernization of the EU-Mexico relations, 
EC Commissioner Cecilia Malmström specifically pointed out that the EU has an interest in Mexican “market 
access in sectors like telecoms and energy”.66 Malmström’s words are consistent with the stated interest of 
Anglo–Dutch multinational oil giant Shell in investing heavily in deepwater oil and gas drilling in Mexico67. 
The Mexican reforms also open up opportunities for other oil companies like British BP and French multi-
national TOTAL. In fact Bloomberg reported that “Shell, BP and national oil companies like China National 
Petroleum Corp. already have agreements to collaborate with Mexico’s state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos, 
or Pemex, which may boost their chances for joint ventures” 68. 
Reforms that would open 
Mexico’s energy industry to 
foreign investment “would 
give resource-hungry energy 
companies access to Mexican 
oil for the first time in more 
than seven decades”
CNBC news65
Unmasked: Corporate rights in the renewed Mexico-EU FTA  |  11
The strengthening of investment protections under 
the new EU MX FTA will guarantee that companies will 
enjoy indefinite years of exploitation, undermining the 
environment and public interests without interference 
of national or local governments, unless they want to 
run the risk of being sued through ISDS. The possibili-
ties of investment protection to act as a shackle for 
Mexico’s energy reforms have not gone unnoticed. 
Edgar Uddelohde, a veteran trade professional  
in Mexico, stated: “For the energy sector the most 
important part of TPP is the investment chapter” […]  
“It protects foreign investment and helps to consolidate the energy reforms of Mexico”70. 
Worse still, as it has been proven, ISDS produces a “chilling effect” 71 on regulatory undertakings, making it 
practically impossible to scale back the recent neoliberal economic reforms in Mexico, described above72.
The danger is real considering that a big proportion of the international investment arbitration cases stems 
from the energy sector, and many involve countries that have undergone energy reforms. According to the 
latest UN data, there are 57 known investment disputes that directly relate to extraction of crude petro-
leum and natural gas73. Countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region are the biggest target. They 
have been hit with 46 per cent of all the oil and gas related cases (26 out of 57 known disputes). Also, oil 
and gas lawsuits are on the rise. The last decade alone (2005-2016) registered 46 disputes, which account 
for 81 per cent of all the disputes in these two sectors since 1985.
Source: UNCTAD Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator74
“Mexico’s vote on rules for the 
end of its 76-year state-oil 
monopoly couldn’t come at a 
better time for global energy 
companies from Exxon Mobil 
Corp. to Royal Dutch Shell Plc.”
Bloomberg69
In part, the EU’s rush to “modernize” the MX EU FTA comes as 
a response to the conclusion of the Transpacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP). This mega deal among 12 countries, which 
includes Mexico but not the EU, was signed in February 2016 
and includes a comprehensive investment protection chapter75. 
With this agreement, the EU aims to guarantee that European 
corporations have the same unrestricted access, protections and 
privileges in Mexico as those in TPP countries. Commentators 
have noted that “The shifting of economic centres of gravity 
towards the Pacific puts pressure on the EU to adapt to this 
new scenario.”76
“The trade agreement will give 
protection to impede that future 
presidents of the country try to 
revert Mexico´s energy reform”
Ildefonso Guajardo, Minister of Trade of Mexico, 
in relation to Mexico’s participation in the 
Transpacific Partnership Agreement77 
Number of known investment treaty disputes related to extraction 
of crude petroleum and natural gas
1985-1994 1995-2004 2005-2016
46110
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3. It will be much harder for Mexico and individual 
European countries to pull out of this agreement
Mexico currently has 15 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with European Member States78. The European 
Commission (EC) claims there are inconsistencies among the level of protection provided to EU investors. Therefore, 
an investment chapter, they claim, will resolve these “inconsistencies“ among the existing BITs79. However, what the 
EC does not mention is that most of those 15 BITs entered into force in the early 2000s and have an initial valid 
period of 10 years after which they can be terminated unilaterally by the States80. An analysis of the termination 
clauses in all 15 Mexican BITs with EU member States indicates that 7 treaties can be terminated at any time, and 
other 6 can be terminated by 2019. This gives the Mexican government great discretion to assess, as some other 
countries like Indonesia, South Africa, Ecuador, Bolivia and 
Australia have done recently, whether to maintain these 
agreements in light of a cost-benefit analysis. However, the 
signing of a new FTA with an investment chapter would au-
tomatically replace the current bilateral investment treaties. 
As a result, the government will find it much more difficult 
to withdraw support for greater rights to foreign investors. 
To terminate the protection of foreign investors clauses in a 
future EU Mexico FTA, the government would have to put an 
end to the whole agreement, not just the investment chapter. 
Reports show that the Mexican government is not overly 
enthusiastic about the idea of negotiating a new investment 
agreement with the EU81.
The coverage of foreign investors able to sue will be expanded
Mexico has BITs with 16 out of 28 EU Member States. A new investment chapter embedded in the FTA would 
extend the coverage of rights provided to investors to the other 12 European countries that don’t have a BIT 
with Mexico84.
“This [investment protection] is a 
non-issue for Mexico, which feels 
perfectly comfortable with its BITs 
with most EU Member States. The EU 
will have to convince Mexico (and its 
own Member States) that introducing 
a new chapter that modifies the BIT 
approach makes sense”
European Parliament study 82 
Partners Date of  signature
Date of  
entry into 
force
Beginning of period 
when treaty could be 
terminated unilaterally 
Ready to be terminated 
at any time
Austria 29/06/1998 26/03/2001 2011 (art 30)
Czech Republic 04/04/2002 13/03/2004 2014 (art 25)
Denmark 13/04/2000 23/09/2000 2010 (art 23)
Finland 22/02/1999 30/08/2000 2010 (art 24)
France 12/11/1998 12/10/2000 2010 (art 13)
Germany 25/08/1998 23/02/2001 2011 (art 22)
Sweden 03/10/2000 01/07/2001 2011 (art 21)
Initial 10 year period 
has passed but it was 
renewed and now 
there is a new deadline 
for expiration and 
termination
BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union)
27/08/1998 14/03/2003 2023 (art 22) 
Greece 30/11/2000 26/09/2002 2022 (art 21) 
Italy 24/11/1999 05/12/2002 2017 (art 12) 
Netherlands 13/05/1998 01/10/1999 2019 (art 13) 
Portugal 11/11/1999 04/09/2000 2019 (art 21) 
The initial 10 year period has not 
yet passed. Once reached, they 
can be terminated at any time
Slovakia 26/10/2007 08/04/2009 2019 (art 32)
Spain 10/10/2006 03/04/2008 2018 (art 23)
United Kingdom 12/05/2006 25/07/2007 2017 (art 27)
TABLE 2  
Current Mexico-EU Member States Bilateral Investment Treaties83
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4. Mexico risks being the target of a new wave  
of investment lawsuits by European investors
The decision to launch the negotiations to “modernize” the MX EU FTA seems to ignore that Mexico has been sued 
at least 23 times by foreign investors at international arbitration tribunals85. In fact, Mexico is one of the most sued 
countries in the world - 7th place according to UNCTAD 2014 statistics86. The majority of these suits have been 
filed by US investors under NAFTA, but in recent years, several European companies have also filed claims against 
the Mexican government, in particular Spanish companies using the Spain-Mexico Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). 
By signing an investment protection agreement with the European Union, the Mexican government continues to 
expose itself to corporate abuse and the risk of having to disburse millions from the public budget. Mexico has 
already paid $246 million USD plus interest in “damages” to nine different companies87. This does not include 
legal or tribunal costs.
Year of  
initiation
Short case 
name
Outcome of 
original proceedings
Home State  
of investor
How much it paid in 
damages to investors 
(in US dollars)
EUROPEAN INVESTORS
2000 Tecmed v, Mexico Decided in favour of investor Spain 5,500,000 plus interest
2004 Gemplus v, Mexico Decided in favour of investor France 6,350,000
2009 Abengoa v, Mexico Decided in favour of investor Spain 40,300,000 plus interest
2012 Telefonica v. Mexico Pending Spain 1,060,000,000  
2013 Cemusa v. Mexico Discontinued Spain N/A
INVESTORS FROM OTHER NATIONALITIES
1997 Azinian v. Mexico Decided in favour of State United States N/A
1997 Metalclad v. Mexico Decided in favour of investor United States 15,600,000 
1998 Waste Management v. Mexico (I) Decided in favour of State United States N/A
1999 Feldman v. Mexico Decided in favour of investor United States 740,000 plus interests
2000 Waste Management v. Mexico (II) Decided in favour of State United States N/A
2001 Adams v. Mexico Discontinued United States N/A
2002 Thunderbird v. Mexico Decided in favour of State Canada N/A
2002 Fireman's Fund v. Mexico Decided in favour of State United States N/A
2002 Frank v. Mexico Discontinued United States N/A
2002 GAMI v. Mexico Decided in favour of State United States N/A
2004 Talsud v. Mexico Decided in favour of investor Argentina 9,158,000 
2004 ADM v. Mexico Decided in favour of investor United States 33,500,000 plus interest
2004 Corn Products v. Mexico Decided in favour of investor United States 58,000,000
2005 Bayview v. Mexico Decided in favour of State United States N/A
2005 Cargill v. Mexico Decided in favour of investor United States 77,300,000 plus interest
2013 KBR v. Mexico Decided in favour of State United States N/A
2015 Shanara and Marfield v. Mexico Pending Panama N/A
2015 LMC v. Mexico Pending Canada N/A
Source: UNCTAD (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/136?partyRole=2)
TABLE 3  
Investment lawsuits against Mexico
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BOX 1  
European Investors cashing in on Mexico 
The Mexican government has already paid 52 million US dollars to European investors as a result of three 
different lawsuits where the tribunal ruled against the government. French company Gemplus received 
6,350,000 US dollars; Spanish companies Abengoa and Tecmed received 40,300,000 US dollars plus 
interest and 5,500,000 US dollars plus interest respectively.
Tecmed (Spain) vs Mexico: 
ICSID tribunal rules in favour 
of the company for the 
closing down of the Cytrar 
facility for illegal toxic wastes 
by the local authorities of 
Hermosillo, Sonora.  Social 
groups  – namely the Consejo 
Ciudadano de Protección 
al Medio Ambiente de 
Sonora - convinced the local 
authorities to close down the 
facility89. 
Mexico is still facing two open investment arbitration cases, one of those by Spanish telecommunication 
company Telefónica that is demanding the staggering amount of over 1 billion US dollars in compensation90.  
According to Telefónica it lost revenues due to regulatory changes, in particular due to the reduction by Mexico 
of interconnection tariffs, which is the fee that telephone operators charge one another to connect calls91. 
A 2012 OECD review of the Telecommunication sector in Mexico found that “The lack of telecommunication 
competition in Mexico has led to inefficient telecommunications markets that impose significant costs on the 
Mexican economy and burden the welfare of its population”. The study estimates the cost to the Mexican 
economy is 25 billion US dollars each year. It recommended higher regulation of the sector and it supported 
the measure taken by the government that led to the dispute92.  
Although the number of ISDS cases against Mexico from European companies remains relatively low, compared to 
those from the United States, there is a high risk of an increase in costly investment lawsuits if Mexico continues  
to grant investors high level of protection and recourse to ISDS.
EU investors are the main users of the ISDS system. Investors from EU member states have initiated 53% of all 
known ISDS disputes worldwide. In particular, investors from the Netherlands, the UK and Germany “are the 
most active in terms of bringing ISDS cases” according to the United Nations93. This coincides with the list of 
European countries investing the most in Mexico: the Netherlands 34%, Spain 32%, Belgium 11%, Great Britain 
6.6% and Germany 6.2%94. On the other hand, Mexican investors seem to have only used the ISDS system once, 
in a case against the United States95. So, the agreement will not only serve the interest of big business, it will 
serve primarily the interest of big European business, who are the likely users of the system. 
The higher risk of further lawsuits is also enhanced by an increase in the flows of EU Foreign direct investment to 
Mexico. Since 2000, the average yearly investment flow originating in the EU has tripled. European investments have 
been mainly channelled in the services sector96, such as financial services, tourism and telecommunications. Three 
of the five most important banks in Mexico are European (BBVA Bancomer, Santander Serfin and HSBC). Another 
very visible European investment in Mexico is in the telecoms sector (with Telefónica Movistar) as well as in the beer 
industry. In 2010, the Dutch brewery Heineken bought one of the two big beer producers in Mexico for 6.5 billion 
US dollars. Also, in 2013 Belgian InBev purchased another big brewery, Grupo Modelo, for 13 billion US dollars97. A 
further 50 Dutch companies have recently shown interest in investing in Mexico98.  Incidentally, more than half of law-
suits brought by European companies worldwide have been related to services industries, including financial services 
and telecommunications99. So, investments in these sectors are particularly at risk of leading to investment disputes.
Abengoa and Cofides (Spain) vs 
Mexico (Described in the introduc-
tion):  ICSID tribunal decided in favour 
of the company as a result of the 
government’s decision to not renew 
the permits to operate separate 
landfills of hazardous industrial waste 
in the municipality of Zimapan in the 
Mexican state of Hidalgo88. The local 
mayor decided not to grant the license 
of operation to Abengoa and Cofides in 
response to the local opposition united 
under the movement “Todos somos 
Zimapán” (We are all Zimapán). 
Gemplus and Telsud vs Mexico:  
In a particularly absurd case, an ICSID 
tribunal ruled in favour of these com-
panies, which operated the National 
Vehicular Registry (RENAVE), because 
México decided to cancel the conces-
sions to these companies in 2002 
when it was revealed that the director 
and shareholder of RENAVE, Ricardo 
Miguel Cavallo (aka “Serpico”), was a 
former Argentine military leader ac-
cused of human rights crimes. Cavallo 
was indicted by a Spanish court on 
charges of genocide in 2003. 
TABLE 4  
Mexican companies penetrate Europe104
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5. EU governments could become the target of lawsuits 
by Mexican multinationals
The creation of an investment chapter under the Mexico EU FTA 
increases the risks that European government could also face 
a flood of new suits. While not on par with the level of European 
investment in Mexico, Mexican transnational companies are 
increasingly investing in Europe (see table below), and in 
particular in Spain100.
According to a report in Forbes magazine, 2014 marked a record 
high of Mexican investment in Spain. Quoting analysis from KPMG, 
Mexican investment in Spain that year amounted to 1,177 million 
Euros. Mexico became the 5th largest investor in Spain (five years 
previous it had been the 15th). The report says that in the previous 
two years 14 acquisitions by private Mexican companies have been 
done in Spain for nearly 2 billion US dollars101. 
Reports indicate how Mexican companies have made a fortune buying European companies, mostly Spanish, 
since 2012103. 
2012 
Kuo buys a subsidiary in Belgium of Swiss Hoerbiger
Villacero buys German steel maker  
Coutinho & Ferrostaal
Mexichem buys Dutch PVC Wabin 
ALFA buys US car maker JL French that operates  
in Scotland and France 
America Movil (of Carlos Slim) invests in Dutch KPN 
and Telecom Austria 
Monex buys the British money exchange company 
Schneider Foreign Exchange 
Grupo Carso (of Carlos Slim) invests in the  
Spanish football club Real Oviedo 
Inmobiliaria Carso (of Carlos Slim) buys branches  
of the CaixaBank of Spain 
2013 
Solartec buys Belgian solar panel manufacturer 
Photovoltec
Graufoz Group buys Spanish maker of panel covers 
Paneles Paseiro 
Metarsa buys German car parts maker ISE Automotive 
Inbursa invests in Spanish energy company  
Gas Natural Fenosa
America Movil invests in Music App company  
Shazam based in the UK 
Cemex buys the Chzec subsidiary of the  
cement company Holcim 
ADO buys the Spanish bus company Avanza 
Fibra Uno buys a building portfolio of the  
Spanish Bank Sabadell 
PEMEX takes control of the Spanish shipyard  
Hijos de J, Berreras 
Alfa SAB’s Sigma Alimentos food unit buys 
Campofrio, the largest cold meats and processed 
food company in Spain 
Del Valle family buys 6% of Spanish  
Banco Popular’s shares
2014105
Extrusiones Metálicas buys aluminium producer 
Metales Extruidos,
Inmobiliaria Carso becomes major shareholder  
of building company Grupo FCC; 
IAMSA, Grupo Herradura and other Mexican  
entrepreneurs including Carlos Slim buy  
communications Company Prisa (El Pais), 
Financcess México buys IBM Headquarter in Madrid
Alsea buys Food Services Project  
(Domino’s and Burger King operator in Madrid)
Gruma buys Azteca Foods Europe and  
reaches 11 plants in Europe
Grupo Bimbo buys Sara Lee operations in Europe 
 
“After two decades in which 
Spain amassed assets worth 
€145 billion ($200 billion)  
in Latin America, last year  
was the first in which Latin 
American companies spent 
more on acquiring their 
Spanish counterparts than  
the other way around”
The Economist102
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Also 6 of the top 10 most “globalized 
Mexican companies” show a strong pres-
ence in several European countries106. 
All of these investments and takeovers 
would make European countries suscep-
tible to investment arbitration lawsuits by 
Mexican companies under a new invest-
ment protection chapter. These would 
add to the increasing number of lawsuits 
against Western EU member states, 
which until very recently had been im-
mune from lawsuits by investors. There 
are 43 known cases against Western 
EU countries107, 29 of which are against 
Spain. The other countries that have 
been sued include: Italy (5), Germany 
(3), Greece (2), France (1), Austria (1), 
Belgium (1) and UK (1). Most of these 
claims (exactly 88%) were filed during 
the last 5 years (2012-2016)108.
6. European companies human rights violations  
in Mexico will continue with impunity
European companies have a track record of human rights and environmental violations in Mexico with virtually 
total impunity (see box below). 
The model investment chapter developed by the European Union — already enshrined in CETA and EU-Vietnam 
FTA — does nothing to address this situation. There is not one single mention of obligations on human rights 
for investors in the EU proposal. This contrasts to the enhanced rights that it would give to transnational 
corporations. 
This is no surprise. State and corporate violation of human rights in Mexico have been largely ignored by the 
European Union. The current Mexico EU FTA includes a Human Rights and Democratic Clause109, which was 
a novelty in the agreement. Yet, during the 15 years 
since the entry into force of this treaty, despite the 
efforts of civil society110 to provide this clause with a 
“positive dimension” that would make it operative, it 
has been a merely “decorative element”111. Yes, the 
European Parliament has publicly condemned hu-
man rights violations on some occasions112, but there 
has not been any attempt by the European Union to 
suspend the implementation of the agreement as was 
foreseen in Article 58 in case of human rights viola-
tions. Civil society organizations have long condemned 
that “authorities of the European Union have shown 
themselves to be indifferent in relation to the constant 
charges of human rights violations, both by the Mexican 
State as well as by European companies”113. 
BOX 2 
Most globalized Mexican companies
Company Sector
European countries  
in which it operates 
Cemex Cement, 
ceramics  
and glass
Germany, Austria, Spain, France, 
Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Norway, Poland, United Kingdom, 
Czech Republic
Grupo 
Bimbo Consumer goods Spain, Portugal
Mexichem Chemical and 
petrochemical
Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Holland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
United Kingdom, Czech Republic, 
Romania, Serbia, Sweden
Alfa Holding 
company
Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Spain, 
Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic
Nemak Automotive  
and Parts
Germany, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary, Austria, Spain
Gruma Consumer goods United Kingdom, Holland, Italy
Mexico is “a country where an 
estimated 98 percent of all crimes 
remain unsolved, with the great 
majority of them never properly 
investigated […] there is an overall 
consensus nationally, regionally, and 
internationally on the severity of the 
human rights situation in Mexico”
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein120
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Since the so-called “war on drugs” was unleashed by former president Calderon in 2006, more than a 
hundred thousand people have been killed or disappeared114. International bodies and organisations such 
as UN Human Rights Council115, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights116, Amnesty International117, 
Human Rights Watch118, and a wide number of other civil society organisations have documented and 
denounced the “context of violence and impunity in Mexico” 119.
But human rights violations in Mexico are also a result of widespread corporate impunity, including European 
businesses. Transnational corporations operating in Mexico have violated “the right to consultation, free, prior 
and informed consent and self-determination; to collective ownership; to a healthy environment; autonomy; 
to freedom of association, generating offal, forced displacement, disruption of the social fabric, pollution and 
overexploitation of natural resources in Mexico” 121. 
Furthermore, “the defenders of human rights, especially 
at the community level, that seek full respect for human 
rights against corporate interests are often victims of 
criminalization, harassment, threats, physical assaults 
and even murders”122. European multinationals have also 
been accused of violating access to basic public services; 
the right to food sovereignty and security; labour rights; 
indigenous rights; environmental rights123.
Aguas de Barcelona: The Spanish company 
dedicated to services, distribution and treatment 
of water is accused of violating the human right to 
water for over-exploitation of aquifers in the city 
of Saltillo, causing a deterioration in the quality 
of water. The company has also been blamed for 
increasing tariffs beyond the agreement making 
drinking water inaccessible to most users (92%) 
that come from the low-income sector126. 
Continental Tire: The German company 
Continental AG has been accused of violating the 
labour rights of 1,164 workers at its Mexican sub-
sidiary Euzkadi Rubber Company when in 2001 it 
closed the company. In addition to the dismissal 
of all workers, the multinational has allegedly 
tried to prevent the right to strike, and pressured 
workers and their families with reprisals like 
withdrawing basic health services127. 
Holcim Cement Company: The Swiss giant cement 
company Holcim is charged with health and environmental 
damages to the community where they operate in Mexico.  
In particular, they have been accused of polluting the 
environment with toxic substances that have caused acute 
intoxication and health damage to the local population, 
including a high number of children128.
Union Fenosa (and other European companies): The 
giant Spanish electricity multinational developed a large wind 
project in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in the state of Oaxaca, 
where it is accused of violating ILO Convention 169, the 
only international law specifically designed to protect tribal 
peoples’ rights. Local communities charged that the com-
pany is pressuring farmers to sign contracts they often don’t 
understand in order to give up their rights to land129. Other 
European companies currently involved in the investment 
and development of wind energy projects are Acciona Wind 
Power (Spain)130 and EDF-Energies Nouvelles (France)131.
BOX 3  
European companies history of human rights violations in Mexico
The Permanent’s People Tribunal (PPT) has held 4 different sessions125 where European companies were accused 
of breach of human rights and environmental violations in Mexico.  Among the European companies accused are 
giants like BASF, BAYER, NESTLE and SUEZ. The cases highlighted below were part of those presented during the 
PPT sessions:
“We can conclude that there have 
been human rights violations by EU 
multinational companies in Mexico”
Ecorys, consulting firm carrying out the Sustainability 
impact assessment of EU Mex Trade Agreement for 
the European Commission124
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Conclusions and recommendations
The modernization of the MXEU FTA presents us with more questions than answers: who wants this new 
agreement and why? Whose interest will be represented and who will it benefit? 
A preliminary analysis, based on the available information, does not answer all these questions but, at 
the very least, it shows that the European Union is aiming to expand investment protection by granting 
sweeping corporate rights to foreign investors in order to lock in neoliberal pro-business reforms in the  
oil and gas sector in Mexico. As a result, Mexico risks a surge in investment lawsuits by European investors; 
EU member states might also see themselves in the dock of the accused by Mexican multinationals.
The other element that clearly emerges is that the EU has for the last 15 years ignored not only the 
human rights violations committed by the Mexican government, but also the accusations of human rights 
and environmental abuses in Mexico by European companies. The inclusion of an investment protection 
chapter in this agreement will further widen the imbalance between soft law for the protection of human 
rights versus hard law in the form of powerful enforcement mechanisms regarding corporate rights. The 
complete absence of binding obligations for foreign investors in the EU investment proposal will help to 
perpetuate a history of corporate impunity.
If Mexico and the EU would move to modernise their relationship, it should be based on redressing the 
imbalance in favour of transnational corporations observed during 15 years of this free trade agreement. 
This approach could start by:
1. developing an independent assessment of the shortcomings of the Human Rights and Democratic 
Clause embedded in the current EU-Mexico FTA
2. carrying out, with strong participation of social organisations and affected communities,  
a systematic study of human rights and environmental violations linked to European investors 
operating in Mexico
3. adopting enforceable obligations for corporations, for example in the context of the UN efforts 
to develop a binding treaty on business and human rights.
4. create affordable, effective and expeditious mechanisms to ensure access to justice for victims 
of human rights violations committed by EU or Mexico companies. 
Finally, the Mexican government should assess, as some other countries like Indonesia, South Africa, 
Australia and Ecuador have done recently, the termination of its current BITs with European countries, 
taking advantage of the fact that most of them have passed their initial period of validity and may now 
be terminated unilaterally at any time. 
Both parties should respond to the urgent call from civil society and experts worldwide for building an 
alternative legal framework (to the international investment treaties) that favours the public interest 
and rejects broad and unchecked rights for foreign investors132. If the MXEU investment negotiations 
are moulded under the same rubric as TTIP and CETA, transnational corporate impunity will continue 
to flourish. 
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